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A triarchicorganization of behavior, buildingon Skinner's descriptionof respondents and operants, is proposedby introducing
a thirdclass of behavior called"emergents?' Emergen_sarenew responses, neverspecifically reinforced,thatrequireoperations
more complex than association. Some of theseoperationsoccur naturallyonly in animalsabove a minimumlevel of brain
complexiD,, and are developedin an interactionbetweentreatmentand organismicvariables. (Here complextw,is definedin
terms of relative levels of hierarchical integrationmadepossible both by the amount of brain, affordedbothby.brain-body
allometricrelationships and by encephalization,and, also, the elaboration of dendriticand synaptic connectionswithin the
cortex and connectionsbet,._eenvariousparts/regionsof the brain.) Examplesof emergents are discussedto advance this
triarchicview of behavior-the prime example is language. This triarchic view reflects both the commongoals and the
cumulativenature of psychologicalscience.
Scientific psychology has been accused of failure to grow
theoretically. Its critics claim that we do not integrate prior
findings and explanations into contemporary, per',pectives (see, for
example, the discussion and rebuttal by Posner, 1982). A goal of
good science is progress, whether reflected in cumulative
theoretical development, or throug.h Kuhn's (1962) paradigmatic
revolutions, cyclic and dramatic changes that are likely to exclude
many central tenets of the previous theoretical regime in favor of
"more enlig_htened" or "more accurate" approaches.
Science may have moved beyond the phase Kuhn described,
in which paradigmatic development and rejection were the primary
modes of change. Kuhn's unflattering claim that exponents of
different paradigms could not communicate may have been a self-
subverting law; scientists who knew about it may have tried harder
to eliminate their intellectual provincialism. Technological
advances like the "information highway" have countered most of
the contribution that geographical distance made to intellectual
distance. In any case, the present article is an attempt to
circumvent revolution to achieve cumulative progress.
Psychology was (R. I. Watson, 1967), and perhaps still is, in
a preparadigmatic stage characterized by a failure to a_ee
sufficiently on the fundamentals to qualify for a Kuhnian paradigm.
If we are right about the progressive substitution of cumulative
science for paradigmatic revolutions, psychology may move
smoothly from pre-paradigznatic to post-paradigmatic status
without ever clearly having a Kuhnian paradigTn.
Whether or not it is philosophically justifiable, it is trendy to
discuss the "cognitive revolution" kindled in the 1950's and 1960's
and evident in the current popularity of cognitive science.
Behaviorism may not have been a true paradigm, but in any event
cognitivists tended to challenge, discount, or ig-nore five decades of
research in the behaviorist tradition. Conditioning, schedules of
reinforcement, and similar topics once esteemed by behaviorists are
rarely discussed in treatments of human cognition; rather, they
receive limited attention in introductory and animal learning texts.
Ironically, if behaviorism did have a "kingly paradigmatic head that
cognitivism has chopped off, its crown of objective methodolo_
remains firmly in place.
It is true that behaviorism's metatheoretical commitment to
associationism (Marx & Hillix, 1987) has been challenged by the
camp of co maitivists most closely related to traditional computer
science and artificial intelligence. However, the parallel
distributed processing camp, technologically advanced and
sophisticated though it is, relies on a connectionism that is
fundamentally the same as that of Edward Thomdike (1898) or
John B. Watson (1919). (Connectionists frequently do try, to
identify within hidden layers the rule-like patterns that mediate
stimulus-response associations-patterns that are consistent with the
thesis advanced here.) The historical roots of the connectionistic
movement are often overlooked: even the very direct ancestors of
parallel distributed processing (Selfridge, 1955, 1959; Rosenblatt
1958, 1962) are seldom cited.
Although there is thus a recidivistic/modem side of cognitive
psychology, the present thesis is that the rise of cognitive
psychology represents substantial progress--not just change. As
one way of recognizing this progess, we suggest a trichotomous
classification of behavior that recognizes and adds to Skinner's
(1938) distinction between respondent and operant conditioning.
while continuing to acknowledge the importance of antecedents.
behavior, and consequences in psychological research. At the same
time, we assert that there exist complex processes and determinants
of behavior that go beyond those involved in operant or respondent
behaviors. These emergent processes should not be confused with
species-typical behaviors (instincts) that are fundamentally
unlearned adaptations, such as imprinting, taste aversion (i.e., bait
sh_naess), and courtship and migration patterns (see Alcock, 1979).
Consequently, we propose that a third category of behavior.
emergents, be defined to extend the domain of inquiry, for those
who espouse an experimental analysis of behavior. The
recognition of emergents will provide a unifying link connecting
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theseveralcamps(e.g.,behavioristandcognitivist)hattry to
understandbehaviorthroughempirical,systematicresearcht at
identifiestheantecedentsandconsequencesresponsiblefor the
appearance,morphology,anddisappearanceof responses.This
"new" class of behaviors is particularly likely to appear in
organisms possessing cerebral complexity (see earlier definition)
and encephalization (i.e., the extraordinary elaboration of the
cortex relative to the rest of the brain; see Stephan, Bauchot, &
Andy, 1970), as within the order Primates.
Emergents include alterations in the nature of the learning
process (e.g., in the ability to learn relationally as well as
associatively, to form both natural and arbitrary concepts, to
recognize equivalence relations between stimuli that are not
specifically trained/reinforced, and to develop the ability to solve
novel problems in a single trial). Emergent abilities also enable an
organism to learn to use symbols as representations of things and
events not necessarily present, to comprehend and to use language,
to speak and sing, to be able to learn vicariously from secondary
records (e.g., '.,,Tit-ten materials and other records), and to reflect
upon past experiences and events projected in the future--to
mention a few of the salient ones.
From a behavioral perspective, these alterations can be
properly viewed as emergent response modes; from a cog-nitive
perspective, they can be viewed as cognitive operations and
structures. Either way, however, these alterations have properties
that reflect the neuroarchitecture, neurophysiology, and
neuropsychology of specific organisms as affected by specific
experiences, treatments, or rearing conditions.
Precedents in the history of thought have led the present
authors to label this third category of learning "emergent." In the
19th century, John Stuart Mill postulated a "mental chemistry" that
coalesced simple ideas into complex ideas (see Heidbreder, 1933).
Emergent complex ideas had their own distinguishing structures
and properties and, hence, were more than just a composite of the
simpler ideas on which they were based. In the 20th century,
Nissen's (1954) discussions of possibly new and qualitatively
different processes emerging as products of quantitative
elaborations of the primate brain directed the senior author of the
present report into research regarding their etiologies.
An interesting question that arises in this connection is whether
phylogeny to some extent recapitulates the ontogeny of human
development with respect to emergent behaviors. These behaviors,
like all behaviors, depend on an interaction of organismic and
experiential factors; thus, the full complement of emergents is
available only to normal adult humans. It may be that some
animals never get beyond the f'u'st stage of human development--
according to Piaget, the sensory-motor stage. Hiyg_er stages may
emerge in more complex animals. An argument can be made that
linguistically trained chimpanzees, orangutans, and gorillas have
manifested in rare cases some properties of Piaget's highest stage,
the formal operational stage. Some aspects of the intermediate
stages are almost certainly seen in nonhuman primates.
Another fascinating question is how precisely the fundamental
elements of behavior should be described. It is well accepted that
the formation of associations is one basic mental capacib,. This
involves one type of memory. The ability to compare stimuli with
respect to various properties--size, color, shape, and desirability.
for example--seems to be an emergent capacity. Several
researchers, from Krechevsk'y (1932) to Levine (1971) have
presented evidence that animals from rats to humans are able to
generate and test hypotheses about the relationships between
stimuli and reinforcers. These are only two of many possible
emergent capabilities that mi_t be suggested.
Before distinguishing emergents from Skinner's respondents
and operants, consider their important dimensions ofcommonalit3..
First, they are all forms of behavior. Second, the behaviors are
observable and measurable. Third, all three are taxonomic groups
of behaviors. As such, they categorize behaviors so that they can
be better understood and studied with tactics appropriate to their
defining features. It is important to note, however, that, as
categories of adaptive behaviors, they are not to be confused with
scientific explanations. Fourth, each category has antecedents and
consequences that must be defined as parameters of behavior if
valid scientific descriptions and explanations of the form and
continuance of behavior are to be obtained. Fifth, none of the three
categories can be accounted for satisfactorily by, or reduced to, the
operations of any two of the other categories. Generally,
respondents and operants provide the foundation for emergents;
stimulus equivalence relationships, or expectancies (Tolman, 1959)
may also be considered part of this foundation; alternatively,
means-end readinesses and the expectancies on which they are
based can themselves be regarded as emergents.
Brief definitions of each category of the behavioral trichotomy
are as follows:
I. Respondents
Respondents are responses that are elicited, without prior
training, by the presentation of specific stimuli, called
"unconditional stimuli" (UCS) or their conditional associates. It is
reasonable to view respondents as being basically unlearned,
reflexive responses elicited by specific stimuli that organisms
encounter in the natural world. All other things being equal, one
can predict with considerable confidence the form and continuance
of a respondent upon its initial elicitation given the identity of the
subject's species, its state and context, and the specifics of the UCS.
For a given species, set of circumstances, and UCS, a respondent
is very likely to recur time after time in the same form. Generally,
a respondent requires only the impact of the UCS upon a given
specimen, not upon that specimen's history of reinforcement with
the UCS. Pavlovian conditioning involves respondents; the
reinforcer is a stimulus, the UCS, that is correlated with an initially
neutral stimulus, the conditional stimulus (CS). The UCS both
elicits the respondent to be conditioned and serves as the reinforcer.
A_er repeated presentations of the CS-UCS pair, the CS will tend
to elicit a response similar to, though not in detail identical to. the
response elicited initially by the UCS.
1I.Operants
In contrastto respondents, operants are responses that are
emitted by the organism and that are modified by their
consequences. There is no readily definable UCS that elicits the
operant to be conditioned. Rather, the response is initially emitted
with apparent spontaneity by the subject and is not directly
produced by specific operations of the experimenter. The operant
can come to be occasioned by an initially neutral stimulus--a
discriminative stimulus (SD)--that functions somewhat analogously
to the CS in respondent conditioning. Operants function by
operating upon the environment and are selected by the reinforcing
properties of the environment (e.g., the locations of nourishment,
contrasted with sources of pain and trauma). Reinforcers for
operants can be any external stimuli that increase the probability
that the operant will be emitted. Consequently, by contrast to
respondent conditioning, where the reinforcer is a rather specific
UCS, in operant conditioning any of a number of consequences
(e.g., things and events) might sustain the acquisition and
continuance of an operant.
In the case of both respondent and operant conditioning, the
presentation of the antecedent stimulus may provide a necessary
context for the conditioned response to be manifested (i.e, for a
discriminated operant, or for a respondent). Their learning entails
reinforcers as consequences. There are several different types of
procedures for both respondent and operant conditioning, and for
schedule--of-reinforcement effects, that are beyond the scope and
purpose of this paper.
III. Emergents
Emergents are new competeneies and or new patterns of
responding that were never specifically reinforced by operations of
the experimenter. They are no____ttrelatively simple, unitary responses
(e.g., salivating, eye blinking, jumping over a hurdle, pecking a
target, pressing a bar, or even chains of such behaviors) as in the
case of respondents and operants. Several good examples of what
we call emergents are presented by Sidman (1994; see Rumbaugh,
1995, for a review) stimulus--equivalence paradigm, in which as a
result of a few specifically reinforced responses to relationships
between specific stimuli, a substantially larger number of
unreinforced relations can be obtained that, in turn, demonstrate
"stimulus equivalence," defined by the properties of reflexivity,
symmetry, and transitivity. These associations have been described
by Sidman as having "emerged"; hence, their classification here as
emergents is congruent with Sidman's view of them.
Emergents occur in a variety of contexts, in addition to that of
Sidman's stimulus equivalence paradigm. These examples of
emergents will be discussed subsequently, but each of them has in
common the following attributes: (1) All emergents are forms of
silent learning--by which it is meant that learning or acquisition of
new response patterns or the cultivation of new competencies (i.e.,
the emergents) might progress with no obvious manifestation. (In
reference to various aspects of inhibition, excitation, second order
conditioning, and so on, Flaherty, 1985, pages 126-127, uses the
term "silent" in his discussions of kinds of learning that go
unnoticed unless special tests are instituted.) Emer,,ent
behaviors/competencies may go unmeasured, if not anticipated.
unless the subject is tested in unique/altered contexts for transfer of
learning and novel patterns of behavioral adaptation. However.
subjects may spontaneously manifest emergents if, during training.
they markedly alter their responses in a way that is both novel and
extraordinarily adaptive. (2) The emergent behaviors/skills were
never intentionally or systematically reinforced as part of the
experimenter's treatment procedures. (3) The emergent
behaviors/skills are established through induction, so it would
appear, by the organism. Again it should be noted that emergents
sometimes surprise the observer when they first appear--a
consequence of the fact that they were not specifically reinforced
or trained by the experimenter. (4) Emergents are noted for their
apparent appropriateness to new situations. Emergents can make
their appearance in new contexts which only in principle are similar
to those in which they formed. The), generalize between contexts
not on the basis of the of specific stimulus dimension, as in stimulus
generalization, but rather on the basis of relationships benveen
stimuli and or rules. The relationships and/or rules referenced here
can be between any kind or number of elements (stimuli, responses,
reinforcers, etc.) that are shared by two or more contexts.
Interim Summa_'. Although emergents, like operants and
respondents, provide for adaptation and generally gain in stren_h
with time and experience, only emergents are characterized by their
complexity (e.g., heirarchical inte_ation and creativity) and by
their adaptive value in highly novel contexts. These contexts must
be novel enoug_h that, as posited above, generalization on
traditional stimulus and response dimensions cannot provide a
sufficient account for the response. Additionally, whereas
operants, respondents, and emergents all depend on antecedents
and consequences, and are sensitive to contingencies, emergents
are not as readily accessible to the experimenter for specific
shaping by consequences as are operants. Hence, emergents are
distinguished from respondents and operants in that they can appear
in novel, unanticipated forms that frequently appear to be clever,
creative, and, indeed, smart.
Emergents differ from respondents and operants in still other
important characteristics: Whereas both respondents and operants
are relatively specific responses that can become conditioned to
initially neutral stimuli, emergents are modes of responding or
solving problems that are not "forced" by specific
antecedents/stimuli, such as a UCS or S °. Also, the overt motoric
response entailed in the conditioning of respondents and operants
is fundamentally the same as the resultant conditioned response,
whereas an emergent response might be strikingly different from
the behavior manifested by the subject during the training
experiences that generated the emergent response. Whereas overt
motor responses are generally required by the subject for the
conditioning of respondents and operants (sensory. preconditioning
is a notable exception), emergent responses can be learned silent[.v
by"an apparent passive subject through observation. Finally, the
learning of respondents or operants can be easily charted, for
example by a cumulative recorder, whereas the formation of
emergent response modes may not be discernible, because neither
their formation nor their probability of later emission necessarily
are indexed by concomitant behaviors.
Table I.
Parameter
A. well-defined CS or
antecedent
BI acquisition depends
upon experience with
specific and limited
antecedents and
consequences
C. overt response required
and recordable during
acquisition
D. conditionable to CS/S °
E. based on histories that
emphasize generahzed
classes of experiences
F. repetition of trials or
events important
G. new response modes
form and provide for
novel adat_tations
H. appears in novel
contexts/problems and
transfer tests
I. entails syntheses of
individually acquired
responses
J. particularly sensitive to
Early Rearin_ variables
K. interactive products of
Task X O_anismie
variables (e.g., brain
complexit), as per
maturation and species)
RespondentsI Operants
yes yes
yes
ve..._s yes
yes
n_.q
yes
no
n._oo no
n_o.o no
n_q n_
no no
* sensory, preconditioning is a notable exception
ve.__s
yes
n_q
ves
no_2
Emergents
n._q
n._q
No-their
formation ma'
be SILENT
no
ve___s
yes?
ve._.ss
ve..___s
ve_..ss
re_As
ve__ss
These distinctions between respondents, operants, and
emergents are summarized above in Table 1. Most important,
however, is that emergents are much more likely to be revealed in
treatment.Y organismic interactions, where "organismic" refers to
both between- and within-species variables, than are either
respondents or operants. Some species are able to benefit from
treatment conditions that hinder others, or to which the latter
species are oblivious. For example, although stimulus equivalence
training can generate reflexive, symmetric, and transitive relations
in normal 4-year- old children, it did not in rhesus macaques
fMacaca mulatta; Sidman, Rauzin, Lazar, & Cunningham,
1982)---though that is not to conclude that macaques are incapable
of stimulus-equivalence relations. After appropriate training on
other pairs of numerals, Rhesus macaques can choose the larL,er of
two numerals, never before encountered as a pair, and, thereby.
obtain the _eater number of reinforcers (Washburn & Rumbaugh.
1991, p. 191; see details below). This behavioral skill, like tile
acquisition of symmetric relationships, requires an advanced brain.
but not one so advanced as that of the human child.
Similarly, individuals within a given species benefit
differently from treatment conditions because of parameters such
as age, level of maturation, state of health, and so on. Emergents
can be particularly sensitive to differences in early rearing
conditions. Examples ofemergents from areas of psychology in
which treatment X organism interactions are more likely to be
sought and defined--such as comparative, developmental, and
stimulus-equivalence research--will be discussed to help
distinguish emergents from respondents and operants. The
examples listed in Table 2 do not exhaust those available from
the literature, and future research will surely define additional
ones.
Examples of emergents
Learning set, defined by Harlow in his classic paper of
1949, operationalized procedures which resulted in the
transformation of rhesus subjects from trial-and--error
associative learners to one-trial, seemingly insightful, problem
solvers. Complexity of the brain across species and inte_ity of
the brain within species, along with levels of maturation, were
demonstrated to be powerful organismic variables which, in
interaction with the treatment of learning-set training, affected
the probability that one-trial learning capabilities would emerge.
The ability, to choose the correct (reinforced) one of a pair of
novel stimuli at nearly the 100% level after a single "testing"
trial was the terminal point of learning set formation. From the
cognitivist perspective, the organisms capable of learning set
formation had learned an emergent strateg3', "win- stay,
lose-shift," that they applied to each new pair of stimuli. From a
connectionist perspective, they had learned to strengthen or
reduce associative strengh to stimulus cues enou_ in a single
trial so that they could choose the stronger association at near
100% levels after that trial. Part of the reason for that might be
that all increments or decrements in associative stren_h were
attached to the cues offered by the discriminanda rather than to
other "error factor" cues like ri_t vs left position.
Transfer of learning research has a long and rich history.
Transfer of learning is quantified on a continuum that extends
from strongly negative (eo.=., transfer slows learning), through
null (e.g., no transfer), to strongly positive (e.g., transfer
facilitates new learning). Brain complexity., as represented
within the array of species that comprise the order, Primates, is
also a continuum that extends across several levels. When one
examines transfer--of-training effects in reversal learning as a
function of amount learned prior to the test for transfer, one finds
a remarkable effect--transfer for prosimians with their relatively
Table 2. Research Areas that Produce
Emergent [ Investigators
Harlow, 1949; see Schrier,
Harlow, & Stollitz, 1965, for a
review
Learning set
Transfer Index
Mediational
learning
Ape-language
research
Stimulus equivalence
Latent learning
Rumbaugh & Pate, 1984
Rumbaugh & Pate, 1984
Savage-Rumbau_,
1986, Savage-Rumbaugh &
Lewin, 1994; Savage-
Rumbaugh, Murphy, Sevcik,
Brakke, Williams, &
Rumbaugh. 1993.
Sidman, 1994
Blodgett, 1929;
1948
Mapping Menzel, 1978
Recognition of Gallup, 1983
self in mirror
Counting by a
chimpanzee
Ordinal judgments of
numerals by macaques
lnte_ation of
temporally-separated
explorations of maze
segments
Tolman,
Rumbau_, Hopkins,
Washburn & Savage-
Rumbaug.h, 1989
Washburn and Rumbau_,
1991
Ellen, Sotores, & Wages, 1984
Characteristics
Primates and children's learning changed from trial and error to l-
trial learning as a function of number of problems.
As an interaction between increased brain complexity across taxa
and increased learning prior to test, primates' transfer of learning
changed from negative to positive
In association with increased brain complexity across taxa,
learning shifted from associative to mediational or relational
Chimpanzees learned to use arbitrary, symbols to represent items,
to categorize them symbolically, and to communicate about them
in their absence. Also, learned symbols by observation and came
to comprehend syntax of human speech.
Reinforced choices of specific stimuli in discrimination learning
generated many other relations between stimuli.
Subsequent to exploration of mazes, rats demonstrated learning
had taken place and to obtain incentives in accordance with
privation states.
Chimpanzees, carried and shown locations of foods in an open
field, subsequently obtained them by travelling a route that
required minimal effort.
Chimpanzees, if reared in social m-oups, come to recognize their
images in mirrors, but do not do so if reared alone.
Lana. chimpanzee, learned to count in that she could remove 1,2,
or 3 boxes from a video screen in accordance with the value of
each trial's target number, 1,2, or 3, with only her memory of
intra-trial events to guide her choice.
In transfer tests, rhesus monkeys were able to choose the larger of
two numerals, never before paired, as a consequence of learning
the relative pellet-values of experience with other pairs of
numerals. 0-9, during training. They had acquired a matrix of
relationships between all numerals.
Rats learned a three-table "reasoning-type" problem via
unreinforced exploration of separate segments on separate days.
smooth,smallbrainsbecomesincreasinglynegativeaspre-test
learningincreases,whereasthemorencephalized,large-brained
primates'transfer can become increasingly positive. The
interactive effect between treatment (i.e., amount learned prior to
transfer) and the organismic variable of brain complexity
qualitatively alters the essence of the transfer effect (Rumbau2_h
& Pate, 1984). This phenomenon may be related to, and certainly
confirms, the connection between brain complexiLy and the
ability, to form learning sets. In both cases, organisms with more
complex brains are better able to "escape the bonds" formed by
previous learning in order to form new associations quickly.
Cognitively speaking, more complex organisms learn to identify
"relevant" and discount "irrelevant" cues better than less
complex organisms.
Learning processes also vary, in relation to levels of brain
complexity within the order, Primates. Primates with relatively
smaller and simpler brains learn in accordance with the
traditional stimulus-response associative models that apply best
to the establishment of habits of responding to reinforced
stimulus choices and of not responding to unreinforced stimulus
choices in a multiple-problem, two-choice, discrimination-
learning situation. Whereas some primates with relatively larger
brains and cortical elaborations apparently learn as stimulus-
response learners, others can learn in accordance with a
mediational or relational model which enables the subject to
take, for example, discrimination-reversal test trials seemingly
as a continuance of the initial discrimination task (Rumbaugh
and Pate, 1984). In other words, they discount the fact that the
cue values of the discriminanda have been exchanged and
continue to improve in the execution of choices. These emergent
response modes alter transfer--of-learning effects, and the
essence of the discrimination learning process itself. They are
not a consequence of procedures used by the experimenter to
establish such modes. Rather, they emerge as a consequence of
how brains of greater and lesser degrees of complexity respond
to the same treatments (e.g., the discrimination tasks and tests for
transfer).
Of course, organisms that learn relationally do not cease to
learn associatively. In fact, it seems likely that, for species with
the capaci_' for relational learning, the propensity for relational
versus associative learning improves both with phylogeny and
ontogeny. Thus, rhesus monkeys have demonstrated the
capacity, for relational learning, but have also failed to extract
rule-like relations from other tasks, responding stubbornly (but
generally successfully) according to stimulus-response
associations (Filion, Washburn, & Fragasz?,, 1995).
Stimulus-equivalence training experiences result in
differential outcomes depending upon the species (humans are
markedly superior to nonhuman primates that, at best, have less
ability, to manifest equivalence, symmetry, and transitive
relations) and, within humans, upon whether or not language is
operative (Sidman. 1994).
CotTcept learnhTg for both natural and arbitrao' things and
events varies markedly as a function of species and age level,
when treatment variables (e.g.. tasks) are held constant.
Emergent behaviors may' include generalized identity matching-
to-sample, symbolic matching, and sameness-difference
concepts.
The representational use of symbols, as an abilib., is
strongly controlled by brain complexity and the age at which
such training/learning experiences are given to the subject.
Chimpanzees are clearly capable of using symbols to represent
things not present, as indicated by their ability to classify.
symbols into appropriate categories (for example, whether the
symbol represents a tool or food; see Savage-Kumbaugh, 1986,
for a review of relevant research).
Speech comprehension and the invention of proto--grammar
appear to be strongly related both to the variables of brain
complexity (e.g., monkeys, chimpanzees, and children) and
rearing (i.e., treatment) conditions for the subject. Kanzi, a
bonobo (Pan paniscus) has manifested the ability to understand
novel requests, conveyed to him via sentences spoken by
humans, at a level that compares favorably with a child whose
mental age was 2½ years. He also has employed what would be
termed grammar, if he were a human of 1-1/2 years, in the
productive combinations of._¢,estures and symbols that he uses to
communicate complex messages/requests to his caretakers (for
details see Savage-Kumbau_, Murphy, Sevcik, Brakke,
Williams, & Rumbau_. 1993; Savage-Rumbaugh & Lewin,
1994; Greenfield and Savage-Rumbaugh, 1991). It is also
significant that Kanzi did no._.Sdevelop his language skills as a
result of specific, discrete-trial, reinforced training. Rather, his
skills were acquired quite indirectly--througJa observation of
efforts to teach his mother, Matata, to learn the appropriate use
of word- lexigrams (i.e., geometric symbols) and use a "talking"
lexigram board. Matata, who was then more than 15 years old,
failed to learn any language skills, quite possibly because she
was a feral animal until the age of about 6 years. For her, the
years for the optimal learning of language had long passed. For
Kanzi, however, they had not, for he played about in the context
within which Matata received her scheduled language training
from soon after birth to the age of 2½ 3,ears. Here we have, then,
a prime example of the organismic variable of age (Matata was
too old to learn language skills, while Kanzi was precisely the
right age, as it turned out) interacting with the treatment
condition that consisted not of language training, but, rather, of
exposure to language usage.
Numerical cognition by nonhuman animals provides an
additional example of emergents. As mentioned earlier,
Washburn and Rumbau_ (I 99 I) reported that rhesus monkeys
learn substantially more than which of two numerals is the one
that pays off'the most in food pellets. Two monkeys were
trained with all but seven combinations of pairs of numerals 0
through 9; seven pairs were chosen to be used later as novel test
pairs to determine whether, during training, the monkeys had
learned only to pick one of each specific pair of numerals, or
whether they learned something about the "value" of each
numeral. If, for example, on a given training trial they were
presentedwitha 5 paired with a 3. the selection of the 3 would
result in the automatic delivery, of 3 food pellets, whereas the
selection of the 5 would result in the delivery, of 5 pellets.
During test trials on the seven new pairs in which the numerals
6, 7, and 9 were each used twice (i.e.. 6:4.6:5, 7:5, 7:6, 8:5, 9:7,
and 9:8), one monkey made no errors on their first presentation.
and the other made only two errors. If they had learned only
which numeral to choose in the context of each training pair,
they would not have been able to perform above chance on the
novel pairings. Thus the monkeys performed sig_nificantly above
chance--they may have learned something like a matrix of
relative values.
Alternatively, the animals could have learned a comparison
strategy: they could have attached a value to each numeral as a
result oft.he original training, and learned that they profited most
by comparing each pair of numerals and choosing the one with
the larger value. In Hull's theory, these "values" for each
stimulus would be called "reaction potential." In contemporary.
cognitive terms, these would be representations of quantities
corresponding to the meaning of the numerals. In either case,
this type of comparison is a different process fi'om immediately
responding to any stimulus that has been reinforced, or even to
the stimulus that had the greatest habit stren_h.
Such an altered response mode was not specifically
trained--- nor could it have been demanded. It may, however,
have been prepared through evolutionary, selection for animals
that try. to obtain better nutrients, rather than selecting whatever
food is available. Notwithstanding, the training, in interaction
with the brain/learning capaci_' of the rhesus subjects, allowed
the ability to execute ordinal judgments accurately to emerge, as
reflected in their choice of the larger numeral in novel pairings
presented for test.
Other examples of phenomena fi'om the history of
psychology that exemplify, emergent response modes include
latent learning (Blodgett, 1929; Toiman, 1948) and the effects of
early rearing environments (Riesen, 1982: Bryan & Riesen,
1989; Stell & Riesen, 1987) upon patterns of brain development
and complex learning skills, and still others that are listed in
Table 2. In these experiments, treatment effects interacted with
developmental, hence organismic, variables to determine
whether or not learning was manifested subsequent to
explorations of mazes without specific reinforcement, or whether
learning, language, and speech were compromised as a
consequence of deprivation of appropriate stimulation or of the
opportunity to learn at appropriate levels of maturation.
Even Epstein's (Epstein. 1985; Epstein, Kirshnit, Lanza, &
Rubin, 1984) simulation of"insight" in the pigeon illustrates
what we call an emergent response mode in this paper. Epstein's
pigeon, in a final test, moved a box into position, then stood on it
in order to access a target that was othe_vise out of reach. His
account detailed the antecedents, but it was the pigeon's brain
that processed the prior training and blended it to allow for a
chimpanzee-like solution to a classic problem (Ellen & Pate,
1986). The importance of experiences relevant to task demands
has been recognized by researchers with chimpanzees from the
days of K6hler's (1925) classic studies.
Notwithstanding, it is the subject, be it pigeon or
chimpanzee, whose brain operations generate a new response
mode, an emergent, that allows for problem solution. That
individual and specific prior conditioning ofoperants is part of
the subject's training history., is certainly relevant, indeed critical,
to the emergent response mode; but it is the subject's brain's
processes, contingent as they' are upon the organization and
complexity of the brain, that generate the new, emergent,
response modes. The most salient attribute of those modes is
that, in novel tests/contexts, they provide for adaptive novel
behaviors that are substantially extended in form and
organization beyond those manifested during "training."
Summary
Do operants and respondents operate in the manifestanon of
emergents? Most certainly they do, but it is the novel blending
of them, their varied orchestration and patterning, their
immediate manifestation, that reveals the emergents present in
the brain's operations; it is not specific reflections of antecedents
and contingencies provided by the environment or the
experimenter.
Are emergents reducible to either operants or respondents?
It is the argument of this paper that they are not, though, as
stated above, operants and respondents surely are the behavioral
elements and indicants ofemergents. Indeed it is through
behaviors that by tradition might be termed respondent or
operant that emergents are manifested. Notwithstanding, it is
precisely the non-respondent, non-operant nature that makes
certain behavior an emergent. Emergents make their appearance
as novel patterns of responding or choosing between alternatives,
and they do so with some element of surprise to the observer.
By contrast, both respondents and operants make their
appearance as improved forms of what they were at the very
beginning of training or conditioning. Their basic forms are not
altered. Again, and by contrast, emergents do not have specific
training histories. There is no reason to assert that they were
there in some miniscule form that either became stronger or was
shaped across time, as is the case ofoperants. This is not to
contradict the argument, however, that emergents have their
etiology in the experiences whereby organisms, particularly
those with complex brains, acquired respondents and operants.
Emergents are new competencies, new patterns of behavior,
based in experience, that are produced by novel generative
operations of the subject's brain--a brain whose operations
depend on age, absence of trauma, experience, tasks, and
species.
The category "emergents" encourages the behavioral
researcher to use time-tested tactics that emphasize antecedents
and consequences to study' behaviors that are new patterns and
demonstrate competence for adapting. Alternatively, one may
study the same behavioral modes using a cognitivist point of
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view but that is neither necessary, nor necessarily advantageous
compared to use of the framework herein advanced.
Science moves with the times and new f'mdings. We here
argue that it is timely for behaviorally oriented psychologists to
evaluate the merits of extending Skirmer's "respondent and
operant" dichotomy to a trichotomy that includes the new
category of emergent. The category, "emergent" can facilitate the
inte_ation of large corpuses of comparative, developmental, and
brain research into the behavioral framework, and thereby
substantively enhance the science generated by the rich tradition
of psychological research.
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